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not a volunteer.8 The reason one co-tenant is allowed contribution when both are
living is that both have an interest in the property, and both are primarily liable for
the debt. When one co-tenant pays off the debt, he has protected the interest of his
co-tenant as a necessary incident, and is subrogated to the rights of the creditor to
the extent that he has paid more than his share of the debt.9 After the death of one
joint tenant, the survivor is not removing a lien on property in which he and the
estate of the deceased joint tenant are jointly interested, but is removing a lien from
his own property; property in which he alone is interested. It is unjust to require
the estate of the deceased joint tenant to contribute toward paying off an encumbrance
on the property of another.
There are apparently no cases exactly in point, but there are two analogous
situations, each of which deny contribution or subrogation. The first is the case of
a mortgagor who sells his equity of redemption to a grantee who either assumes,10
or takes subject to the mortgage." Here the original mortgagor then becomes a
surety to pay off the debt only if the grantee is unable to do so, 12 or the value of the
land is insufficient' 3 to pay the debt. The grantee of the land is now the principal
debtor, and the mortgagor is reduced to the position of surety; liable only if the
principal debtor is unable to pay.14 It is to be noted that here the one formerly the
owner and primarily liable now has no interest in the property and is only secondarily
liable. Should the grantee pay off the debt, naturally he would be denied contribution
from his grantor.' 5 The second is the case of a joint tenant co-mortgagor who sells
his interest to his co-tenant. Here too the grantor is reduced from a principal debtor
to a surety. The one formerly an owner and primarily liable now has no interest in
the property and is only liable should the grantee be unable to pay. Contribution
should also be denied here if the now owner of both interests should pay off the debt.
This second case is analogous to the principal case. It should make no difference that
the present sole owner acquired his co-tenant's interest by purchase, or by virtue of
survivorship. In all of these cases a party formerly interested in the property now
has no interest, and his liability is reduced from primary liability to secondary
liability. It is manifest error to allow the principal debtor to recover contribution
from the surety as was allowed in the principal case. T. Marsh.
SALES: WORTHLESS CHECK CASH SALES.-The Supreme Court of Arkansas
held in the case of Pingleton v. Shepherd' that a fraudulent purchase of personal
property is not void but only voidable, and that unless avoided by the seller, the
fraudulent buyer can pass good title to a bona fide purchaser with no notice of the
fraud.
One Wortham gave the plaintiffs a worthless check for the purchase price of an
'Parsons v. Urie, 104 Md. 238, 64 Atl. 927 (1906).
'Carpenter v. Koons, supra note 7.
"Howard v. Burns, 279 Il. 256, 116 N.E. 703 (1917) ; Minnesota Trust Co. v. Peteler Car Co.,
132 Minn. 277, 156 N.W. 255 (1916).




See note 10 supra.
"See note 11 supra.
"See note 10 supra.
"Dodds v. Spring, 174 Cal. 412, 162 Pac. 351 (1917) ; Drury v. Holden, 121 Ill 130, 13 N.E.
547 (1887) ; Lydon v. Campbell, 204 Mass. 580, 91 N.E. 151 (1910).
1242 S.W.2d 971 (Ark., 1951).
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automobile, falsely representing that the check was good, and before any action was
taken by plaintiffs, the car had been sold to defendant, a bona fide purchaser.
Appellants contend that since the fraudulent buyer, Wortham, obtained possession
of the car by means of false representations, title remained in them and that none
could therefore pass to defendant, and that the car could be replevied from defendant.
The trial court held that since the car was obtained through the false representations
that title obtained thereby was voidable, and that since plaintiffs had not avoided
it, Wortham could pass good title to defendant, the bona fide purchaser for value
without notice.
Section 24 of the Uniform Sales Act is cited as the controlling doctrine for the
principle that such a fraudulent purchase is not void, but only voidable. However,
there is a conflict in the courts as to whether such a worthless check cash sale as this
is a void transaction, or only voidable at the election or action of the defrauded
seller.2 Some courts and statutes hold and provide that a defective or voidable title
passes to the fraudulent buyer,3 but it seems that a majority of the courts regard such
payment by check, whether worthless or good, as being merely conditional, with title
remaining in the seller until the check is cashed.
4
Although delivery of the chattel and payment of the purchase money are not in
fact simultaneous in cases where payment is by check, it can hardly be doubted that
such a transaction is in substance a cash sale, and is so regarded by the parties to
the sale.5 That delivery of a check to the seller by the purchaser does not indicate
an intention to extend credit to the buyer until the check is cashed is amply evidenced
by the decisions of the courts.6 In a cash sale the intentions of the parties determine
the effect of transfer of possession on the title of the chattel, where a check has been
given in payment, and the intention may be expressly declared or implied from the
terms and nature of the sale.7 In those cases where the court feels that the seller has
passed a voidable or defeasible title to the fraudulent buyer, it seems as though the
court is looking beyond the buyer and the actual intent of the seller to the position
of the bona fide purchaser, and is attempting to protect the newly acquired "title"
of the purchaser at the expense of the original seller who had a "misplaced confidence"
in the fraudulent buyer, in whose hands mere possession was placed, if such were
2(a) For those decisions holding fraudulent sales voidable, see Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F.Supp.
317 (D. Neb., 1950) ; Keegan v. Kaufman Bros., 68 CaLApp.2d 197, 156 P.2d 261 (1945) ; (b) for
those decisions holding fraudulent sales void, see Young v. Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15,
268 S.W. 125 (1924) ; Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 NJ.Eq. 368, 179 AtI. 279 (1935) ;
Clark v. Hamilton Diamond Co., 209 Cal. 1, 284 Pac. 915 (1930) ; but cf. J. L. McClure Motor
Co. v. McClain, 34 Ala.App. 614, 42 So.2d 266 (1949).
'See note 2(a) supra.
'See note 2(b) supra: ". . .the American judicial materials have preponderantly held, that
where in a cash sale transaction, no credit being contemplated, the goods are delivered on the
giving of a check for the price and the check is not paid on due presentation, the property interest
in the goods never passes to the buyer." Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, 1 HAsT. W. 111, 113
(1950). Then, necessarily, title remains in the seller until the check is cashed, and it then passes
to the buyer.
5Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 NJ.Eq. 368, 179 AtL 279 (1935) ; People's State
Bank v. Brown, 80 Kan. 520, 103 Pac. 102 (1909) ; Vold, supra note 4, at 116-117.
'Casey v. Gallagher, 326 Mass. 746, 96 N.E.2d 709 (1950) ; Clark v. Hamilton Diamond Co.,
209 Cal. 1, 284 Pac. 915 (1930) ; People's State Bank v. Brown, supra note 5; Void, supra note 4,
at 117, note 16.
'South San Francisco Packing & Provision Co. v. Jacobsen, 183 Cal. 131, 190 Pac. 628 (1920);
Nicewarner v. Alston, 228 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App., 1950) (defendant gave a draft on a bank
in payment, but the court grouped drafts and checks together as to the effect of the application
of the law).
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the seller's only "error." It is said by Williston, in his work on Sales, that "if a
seller should say, 'you must not deal with these goods, though I have put them in
your hands, till I collect the check,' that would show an intent not to transfer the
property to the buyer . . ." It may be inferred from that that Williston advocates
an express declaration of reservation of title in the seller in a check cash sale, and
that if such declaration is not present, the court should find the presumption that the
seller intended title to pass, voidable until the check is cashed or until the buyer
resells to a bona fide purchaser.
However, other cases have held that if the seller accepts a check as absolute
payment and gives up possession thereon, title passes unconditionally, but if no intent
is expressed, there is a presumption that the check represents only conditional payment
and that title passes only on payment of the check. 10 It is submitted that the latter
presumption is more founded in reason, for the seller realizes that he holds only
an instrument which may or may not be transmuted into money, and a reasonable
and prudent seller will not entrust the title to his chattels to a man with whom he
is very often acquainted only in an impersonal commercial transaction.
It is generally held by the weight of authority that when the seller entrusts in the
buyer the possession and sufficient indicia or evidence of title to clothe the buyer with
an apparent authority to sell, the original seller will be estopped from asserting his
title as against a bona fide purchaser from the original buyer, and this is so whether
or not the check given in payment of the purchase price has been paid or has been
dishonored on presentment. 1 The rationale behind this doctrine seems to be that the
second buyer should not rely on the possession alone of the prospective seller, but
that when the seller, the fraudulent buyer, has such indicia of title that the reasonable
and prudent man would believe title was in his hands, such evidence is sufficient to
protect the bona fide purchaser if he purchases from the fraudulent buyer,' 2 who
in truth might have obtained such indicia of title or apparent authority to sell directly
from the original seller or through the sheer negligence of the original seller.' 3 And
yet it is submitted that it still is not correct to speak of a "voidable title" or "defective
title" in the hands of the fraudulent buyer, and that the indicia of title was placed
in the hands of the buyer to facilitate the physical elements of the sale by consolidating
them into one operation, and that the seller would intend to treat the entire foregoing
operation as a nullity if the check were not honored or paid. The complete title
would still be in the original seller, subject to defeasance if the chattel were trans-
ferred to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the fraud.
'Keegan v. Kaufman Bros., 68 Cal.App.2d 197, 156 P.2d 261 (1945) (where the true owner is
guilty of no more than misplaced confidence, such misplaced confidence is negligence within Calif.
Civil Code, § 3543, which states, in effect, that where one of two innocent persons must suffer
by the act of a third, he by whose negligence it happened, must be the sufferer).
'2 WILLISTON, SALES, § 346a (3d ed., 1948).
1 0Towey v. Esser, 133 Cal.App. 669, 24 P.2d 853 (1933); National Bank of Commerce v.
Chicago B. & N. R. Co., 44 Minn. 224, 46 N.W. 342 (1890).
"Sullivan Co. v. Wells, 89 F.Supp. 317 (D. Neb., 1950); J. L. McClure Motor Co. v. McClain,
34 Ala.App. 614, 42 So.2d 266 (1949) (certificate of title); Seward v. Evrard, 240 Mo.App. 893,
222 S.W.2d 509 (1949) (certificate of registration and license).
"2Seward v. Evrard, supra note 11; E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Laird, 24 Del.Ch. 152,
8 A.2d 162 (1939) (shares of stock indorsed in blank with power of attorney to transfer them on
the books of the corporation) ; Dresher v. Roy Wilmouth Co., 118 Ind.App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260
(1948) (possession plus lien-free, clear title).
"3Where, as dictum, the court states that the seller's "misplaced confidence" in the trustworthi-
ness of the buyer is negligence, see Keegan v. Kaufman Bros., 68 Cal.App.2d 197, 203, 156 P.2d
261, 267 (1945) ; that acceptance of a check is the usual custom and does not intimate negligence,
see Cowan v. Thompson, 25 Tenn.App. 130, 152 S.W.2d 1036 (1941).
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A rebuttal of this hypothesis has been put forth that if a buyer is not entitled
to resell the goods or deal with them as his own until the check is paid, then even a
person whose check was backed by sufficient funds would be a tortfeasor if he sold
the goods before payment of the check, in that he would be dealing with goods of
which he had not title in a manner adverse to the true owner's interests. 14 A sufficient
answer to this contention may possibly be found in the holding of several courts that
the payment of the check relates back to the time of delivery, 15 and that therefore
the payment of the purchase is viewed as if the payment had been made in cash.
It would seem to follow that the title of the chattel is looked upon as if it passed
to the original buyer at the time of delivery of the check, but only if the check has
been honored. It is further submitted that the original buyer is not a tortfeasor by
virtue of his dealing with the chattels before the check has been cashed, but that the
original seller has entrusted the buyer both possession and an authority to deal with
the goods with subsequent buyers, but only to the extent of the validity of the check.
If the goods are in the hands of a subsequent purchaser and the check is honored,
payment and passage of title should relate back to the delivery of the check, and the
subsequent purchaser has good title. Further, if the check were dishonored, and the
seller has not presented sufficient indicia of title, the condition precedent to passage
of title in a cash sale would not have been fulfilled, title would remain in the original
seller, and he would be able to recover the chattel from the second purchaser on the
basis of the many decisions that a subsequent purchaser is not entitled to rely solely
on the possession of the chattel by his seller.
16
As heretofore stated, when a check is given in payment of chattels, and possession
alone is given to the buyer, title does not pass until the check is passed, and delivery
of the check is regarded as conditional payment, with no intention of any extension
of credit to the buyer. 17 And the majority of the courts should and do hold that
title remains in the seller even as to a bona fide purchaser from the buyer, even though
the subsequent buyer has no notice.' 8
But the trend of the law seems to be in the direction of increasing the negotiability
of goods,19 which would ultimately be to the detriment of the seller who accepted
worthless checks for the purchase price in cash sale transactions, as the bona fide
purchaser would obtain greater favor in the eyes of the court and the original seller
would hold his title with a less firm grip when faced with a claim of a bona fide
purchaser from a fraudulent buyer.
Richard Soulsby.
1'2 WILLISTON, SALES, § 346a (3d ed., 1948).
1 'Drukker v. Howe & Haun Investment Co., 136 Cal.App. 437, 29 P.2d 289 (1934) ; Texas
Mut. Life Ins. Assn. v. Tolbert, 134 Tex. 419, 136 S.W.2d 584 (1940); Hayes v. Federal Ship-
building & Drydock Co., 5 NJ. Super. 212, 68 A.2d 766 (1949); Franciscan Hotel Co. v. Albu-
querque Hotel Co., 37 N.M. 456,24 P.2d 718 (1933).
""Clothing another person with indicia of ownership does not mean simply giving him posses-
sion of a chattel." Sherer-Gilett Co. v. Long, 318 Ial. 432, 149 N.E. 225 (1925) ; but cf. Goddard
Grocer Co. v. Freedman, 127 S.W.2d 759 (Mo., 1939) (court said that possession alone is strong
indicium of title, and is regarded by the courts as prima facie evidence of title).
"TSee notes 4 and 6 supra.
1 8Urroam SALES AcT, §23(1); Morehouse v. Keyport Auto Sales Co., 118 NJ.Eq. 368,
179 Atl. 279 (1935).
"
9UNIFOrM REVISED SALES AcT, § 2-405 (c), especially Comment 7.

